The European Carbon Market in Action: Lessons from the First Trading Period Interim Report by Convery, Frank et al.
MIT Joint Program on the
Science and Policy of Global Change
The European Carbon Market in Action:
Lessons from the First Trading Period
Interim Report
Frank Convery, Denny Ellerman, and Christian De Perthuis
Report No. 162
June 2008
The MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change is an organization for research,
independent policy analysis, and public education in global environmental change. It seeks to provide leadership
in understanding scientific, economic, and ecological aspects of this difficult issue, and combining them into policy
assessments that serve the needs of ongoing national and international discussions. To this end, the Program brings
together an interdisciplinary group from two established research centers at MIT: the Center for Global Change
Science (CGCS) and the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR). These two centers
bridge many key areas of the needed intellectual work, and additional essential areas are covered by other MIT
departments, by collaboration with the Ecosystems Center of the Marine Biology Laboratory (MBL) at Woods Hole,
and by short- and long-term visitors to the Program. The Program involves sponsorship and active participation by
industry, government, and non-profit organizations.
To inform processes of policy development and implementation, climate change research needs to focus on
improving the prediction of those variables that are most relevant to economic, social, and environmental effects.
In turn, the greenhouse gas and atmospheric aerosol assumptions underlying climate analysis need to be related to
the economic, technological, and political forces that drive emissions, and to the results of international agreements
and mitigation. Further, assessments of possible societal and ecosystem impacts, and analysis of mitigation
strategies, need to be based on realistic evaluation of the uncertainties of climate science.
This report is one of a series intended to communicate research results and improve public understanding of climate
issues, thereby contributing to informed debate about the climate issue, the uncertainties, and the economic and
social implications of policy alternatives. Titles in the Report Series to date are listed on the inside back cover.
Henry D. Jacoby and Ronald G. Prinn,
Program Co-Directors
For more information, please contact the Joint Program Office
Postal Address: Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
77 Massachusetts Avenue
MIT E40-428
Cambridge MA 02139-4307 (USA)
Location: One Amherst Street, Cambridge
Building E40, Room 428
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Access: Phone: (617) 253-7492
Fax: (617) 253-9845
E-mail: glo balcha nge @mi t .e du
Web site: ht t p://mi t .e du / glo bal change /
 Printed on recycled paper
Report 162 is an international collaborative special report included in the Report Series of the MIT Joint
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change.  It does not appear in the standard format and style of the
Joint Program Report Series.  The format and style of the original publication has been maintained.
  
 
THE EUROPEAN CARBON MARKET IN ACTION:  
LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TRADING PERIOD 
 
Interim Report 
 
 
 
 
 
FRANK CONVERY 
DENNY ELLERMAN 
CHRISTIAN DE PERTHUIS 
 
 
 
 
March 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lessons from the First Trading Period, Interim Report March 2008 
 
 
3 
Foreword 
 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest greenhouse 
gas market ever established. The European Union is leading the world’s first effort to 
mobilize market forces to tackle climate change. A precise analysis of the EU ETS’s 
performance is essential to its success, as well as to that of future trading programs. 
The research program “The European Carbon Market in Action: Lessons from the First 
Trading Period,” aims to provide such an analysis. It was launched at the end of 2006 
by an international team led by Frank CONVERY, Christian DE PERTHUIS and Denny 
ELLERMAN. This interim report presents the researchers’ findings to date. It was 
prepared after the research program’s second workshop, held in Washington DC in 
January 2008. The first workshop was held in Paris in April 2007.  
Two additional workshops will be held in Prague in June 2008 and in Paris in 
September 2008. The researchers’ complete analysis will be published at the beginning 
of 2009. 
 
 
The final version of this report was prepared by Cate HIGHT, Raphaël TROTIGNON and 
Christian DE PERTHUIS from the Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. The report is also 
available in French on the website of the Association for the Promotion of Research into 
the Economics of Carbon (APREC), accessible at http://www.aprec.net/. 
 
For more information on this report, please contact: 
 
Frank CONVERY, University College Dublin 
frank.convery@ucd.ie 
+353 (1) 716 2672 
 
Denny ELLERMAN, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
ellerman@mit.edu 
+1 (617) 253 34 11 
 
Christian DE PERTHUIS, Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts, Université Paris-
Dauphine 
christian.deperthuis@caissedesdepots.fr 
+33 (0)1 58 50 22 62 
http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/missionclimat 
 
 
 
 
 
The research program “The European Carbon Market in Action: Lessons from the First 
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1. Historical Background of the EU ETS: How to Transform Failure 
into Success? 
Introduction 
In a context of which Nietzsche would have approved, the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) grew out of failure. Nietzsche admonishes us to: 
Examine the lives of the best and most fruitful people and peoples and ask yourselves 
whether a tree that is supposed to grow to a proud height can dispense with bad 
weather and storms; whether misfortune and external resistance, some kinds of hatred, 
jealousy, stubbornness, mistrust, hardness, avarice, and violence do not belong among 
the favourable conditions without which any great growth even of virtue is scarcely 
possible.1 
The sapling that became EU ETS has survived many of the challenges Nietzsche 
described. At its origin, the scheme was a product of two failures. First, the European 
Commission failed in its initiative to introduce an effective EU-wide carbon energy tax 
in the nineties. Second, the Commission fought unsuccessfully against the inclusion of 
trading as a flexible instrument in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. It is instructive to examine 
each of these events before exploring the evolution of the trading scheme, a framework 
made possible by political cooperation, robust intellectual development and lessons 
from experience in the United States.  
The initial failures 
The Single European Act of 1986, which formally established European political 
cooperation and a single European market, provided the statutory basis for subsequent 
action to address climate change. It highlighted the need to address environmental 
challenges that transcended national frontiers on a community-wide basis, and to do so 
in a cost effective manner. 
These considerations combined to convince the European Commission to propose an 
EU-wide carbon energy tax in 1992.2 Opposition to the proposal came from two 
powerful sources. First, some Member States regarded a carbon tax as blow to their 
sovereignty that would be followed inevitably by other taxing initiatives that would 
incrementally leak fiscal autonomy to the Commission. Secondly, the main industry 
lobby also opposed the tax, with consistent and persistent case-making at Member State 
and EU levels.3 The opposition proved too strong, and the carbon energy tax proposal 
was formally withdrawn in 1997. 
During the same period, The European Union was very active in the international 
climate negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol. Three features characterised the 
European Union’s negotiating position: a commitment to mandatory caps on emissions 
by developed countries, an undifferentiated target of 15% below 1990 emissions levels, 
and an antipathy toward emissions trading as a mechanism for achieving this target. The 
Kyoto Protocol was signed in December 1997. Signatories agreed to caps, but the EU 
failed to achieve its 15% reduction or undifferentiated target goal.  
                                                 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 1882. 
2
 COM (1992) 226. 
3
 Some industry interests at this time proposed emissions trading as a preferable option to taxation, a 
position that proved of relevance later on. 
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In addition, at the insistence of the US delegation led by then-Vice President Al Gore, 
emissions trading between countries was included as a flexible measure, together with 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation. The European 
negotiating team felt that it had failed to achieve most of what it had aimed for, and 
shortly after Kyoto most team members moved on to other assignments. Six months 
after Kyoto, new leadership at the Commission embraced emissions trading.  
The emergence of emissions trading in the European Union4 
A key decision which enabled EU trading to emerge was the Burden-Sharing agreement 
of June 1998. In this agreement, each of the then-15 Member States agreed to a national 
target, the sum of which amounted to the overall Kyoto target of 8% below 1990 
emissions levels.5 These targets were subsequently made legally binding. Also in June 
1998 the Commission issued “Climate Change: Towards an EU Post-Kyoto Strategy,”6 
which stated that the Community could set up its own internal trading scheme by 2005, 
a move which would give the EU practical familiarity and even a leading edge in using 
this tool.  
Member States were first to act on the potential that emissions trading seemed to offer. 
The UK had emerged during the 1990s as the European leader in mobilizing markets to 
address a range of environmental challenges. Denmark had a long tradition of using 
environmental taxes, and so was politically and temperamentally disposed to use 
markets to support environmental objectives. This early action by Member States 
convinced the Commission and others to move quickly at EU level. Otherwise, Europe 
would end up with a patchwork of schemes combining lack of scope and scale and 
probable incompatibilities to make the whole much weaker than the sum of the parts. 
Momentum at the Commission quickly gathered force. Following the publication of a 
Green Paper in March 2000 and subsequent stakeholder consultations, the EU ETS draft 
proposal was submitted in 2001 for formal consideration. The European Parliament 
conducted its first reading of the draft Directive in October 2002, the Council of 
Ministers presented its position in December 2002, and an amended draft Directive was 
adopted and approved by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in July 
2003. On October 13, 2003, emissions trading Directive 2003/87/EC came into effect, 
with trading to start in January 2005. 
What made it possible? 
In most Member States, objections to emissions trading were largely confined to 
industry and its representatives. Thus, securing agreements at the national level required 
the support of several key industrial lobbies. Given this context, the following seem to 
be amongst the key explanations of what made possible the rapid enactment of an 
emissions trading program in the EU: 
- Free allowances. This met the needs of most industrial emitters. The European 
Parliament did take issue with this policy, but it never achieved traction with other key 
stakeholders and the general public. 
                                                 
4
 The legislative history, including key preparatory studies, can be accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/ climat/ emission/ history_en.htm and details are also available at http://www.carbonexpo. 
com/wEnglisch/carbonexpo2/img/dokumente/040316_ Hintergrundinformation_e_Carbon_Expo.pdf. 
5
 Council conclusions of 16-17 June, 1998, Council Doc 9702/98. 
6
 COM (1998) 383 Final, 3rd June 1998. 
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- Fear of the alternative. The use of carbon taxes and/or command-and-control 
regulation was variously proposed as alternative means of reducing emissions. Both of 
these options were less attractive to industry than trading. 
- Information flow from the US generally and US businesses in particular, based on 
the experience of the Acid Rain Program. The US’s success with sulphur dioxide 
emissions trading provided European economists with insights to apply to the European 
situation and provided officials in the Member States and the Commission with a body 
of literature and individual experiences to learn from. 
- The partition of the scheme into two phases, a pilot phase (2005-07) and a second or 
“Kyoto” phase (2008-12). Drawing on operational US experience, the Commission 
became convinced of the huge volume of work that was needed to ensure a quality 
program, and the need to “learn by doing” over a defined period. 
- President Bush’s decision not to seek ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, or to 
implement a substantive alternative, created a space for Europe. This enabled the 
European Commission to take the international lead on climate change policy. It also 
reinforced the view that collective decisions at the EU level are generally more efficient 
than unilateral Member State actions.  
- Use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms was favoured by most stakeholders. 
Industry approved linking the EU ETS with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
and Joint Implementation, as these tools would expand the supply of allowances and 
thus reduce allowance prices. Most NGOs also supported the inclusion of the Kyoto 
mechanisms after the US decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  
While the EU ETS is still in its infancy, the significance (and importance) of the EU’s 
ability to make the scheme operational so quickly cannot be underestimated. The 
European Union is home to 500 million people, living in 27 countries, embracing 23 
languages, with per capita GDP ranging from $42,000 (Ireland) to $9,000 (Romania and 
Bulgaria). And it is not always a harmonious club. The EU ETS is not only playing a 
pivotal role in helping Member States achieve their Kyoto targets, but it is also sending 
a positive message to the international community that global emissions trading is now 
a viable policy tool. 
 
2. The First Step: Allowance Allocation 
Introduction 
Allocation is a unique feature of cap-and-trade systems. Indeed, a critical issue in 
dealing with climate change is deciding who has a right to emit carbon dioxide (CO2), 
under what conditions, and to what extent those emissions are limited. The EU ETS is 
the first instance of creating explicit rights to emit CO2 and distributing these rights 
among sub-national entities. Its performance is attracting world-wide attention.  
Initial conditions faced by the EU Member States 
The experience of the EU allocation process shows how important the initial conditions 
are to the performance of the trading scheme. Member States overcame three major 
problems in the first trading period:  
- Tight time schedules. The Member States faced significant time constraints in 
preparing their National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for the first allocation period. In 
accordance with the Directive, Member States had to submit their first allocation plans 
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to the Commission by 31 March 2004, less than six months after the Directive’s formal 
entry into force on 25 October 2003.  
- Limited data availability. The lack of installation-specific emissions data was perhaps 
the biggest problem that Member States faced in the allocation process. This came as a 
surprise to many, as most countries had developed reasonably good inventories of CO2 
emissions data prior to the launch of the EU ETS. However, this inventory data was 
developed from aggregate energy-use statistics and did not extend to the installation-
specific level. One of the insights from the EU allocation process is that data availability 
limits allocation choice: many a priori preferences were impractical due to the 
difficulties of obtaining installation-level data. This data problem was largely overcome 
by the time the second allocation plans were prepared. 
- Unclear definitions of coverage. A third condition that rendered the preparation of the 
first NAPs difficult was an unclear definition of the types of installations to be covered 
by the trading scheme. The uncertainties arising from these unclear definitions were 
largely overcome in the second allocation phase as a result of increasing experience, 
which allowed the Commission to provide more consistent guidance. 
Setting the allocation constraints 
Three procedures characterized the process by which EU Member States assumed their 
emissions constraints. 
- Interaction between stakeholders and government. The “macro” cap-setting was 
achieved in a decentralized, negotiated process between the Commission and Member 
State governments that reflected the political structure of the European Union. The 
“micro” aspects of allocation could best be characterized as an extended industry-
government discussion dictated by data availability and the ETS mandate to distribute at 
least 95% of allowances to installations for free. These circumstances created an 
iterative process whereby data was collected, cross-checked, refined, evaluated, and 
modified by way of close interaction between stakeholders and governments.  
- Role of central coordination. While the allocation process in the EU ETS was highly 
decentralized, the European Commission provided a vital coordinating role. It acted not 
only as an educator and political facilitator, but also as an ‘enforcer of scarcity’ in its 
review of the NAPs. The Commission used a minimalist approach, focusing its 
decisions on a few issues only. First, it made sure that the total allocation was not overly 
generous. The Commission reduced 15 NAPs in the first allocation phase by 290 
million tons annually and 23 NAPs in the second allocation phase by 242 million tons 
annually. Second, the Commission was vigilant against ex post adjustments. Third, in 
the second allocation round, the Commission limited the number of CDM/JI credits that 
Members could import into the ETS.  
Finally, moving from the first to the second allocation phase, the Commission played a 
stronger role in setting the EU cap, reducing the allocation from the first period to the 
second period. Instead of being negotiated between the Commission and the Member 
States, the Member State totals in NAPII were virtually predetermined by a single 
forecasting model that was transparent and consistent in its treatment of Member States. 
Although different assumptions concerning economic growth and energy efficiency 
improvements were made for individual Member States, the model’s predictions of 
BAU emissions and each Member State’s distance from its Kyoto target were major 
determinants of the caps.7  
                                                 
7
 Nonetheless, the decisions based on this procedure are being challenged by the eight Eastern European 
Member States, who argue that the model does not adequately take into account their unique 
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- Use of projections. A further distinguishing procedure in the EU allocation process 
was the use of emissions projections to set caps and distribute allowances among 
sectors. Member State caps were set using estimates of business-as-usual (BAU) 
emissions, which are uncertain on an ex ante basis. Moreover, the decision to allocate as 
many allowances as needed to non-power sectors required projections of expected 
sector emissions. These projections proved to be error-prone not only because of data 
and modeling problems, but also because of the inherent uncertainty of such predictions 
and the large effect of errors when the intended emission reduction is small. While the 
data problems of the first allocation period were largely overcome and a single 
predictive model is being used in the second period, the uncertainty surrounding 
predictions remains. 
Allocation choices made by the Member States 
Surprisingly, the allocation methodologies applied by the 25/27 participating nations 
were remarkably similar. Four choices seem particularly interesting. 
- Auctioning was only little used. One of the most striking features in the EU allocation 
process was that most Member States chose not to take advantage of the Directive’s 
provision allowing states to auction up to 5% of allowances in Phase I and 10% in 
Phase II. Only four Member States used auctioning in Phase I; auctioned allowances 
accounted for 0.13% of the total allocation. More allowances are being auctioned in the 
second phase, though the quantity is still well below the allowed limit. The general view 
is that auctioning percentages will be much higher post-2012.  
- Strong reliance on recent historical emissions. The disparity between advocacy and 
practice was in no aspect greater than for benchmarking. Benchmarking was strongly 
advocated but nonetheless little used, which is a striking difference from US practice. 
This failure was not the result of lack of trying, but because allocations based on 
benchmarks would have been too far below recent emissions to gain widespread 
acceptance. In the absence of practical benchmarks and given source heterogeneity and 
data limitations, recent emissions became the default option and thus the basic reference 
point. Benchmarking has increased in the second allocation phase, mainly for the power 
sector, but always in a very fuel-differentiated manner.  
- Expected shortage was allocated to the power sector. Another distinctive feature in 
the EU allocation process was that the power sector was obliged to bear almost the 
entirety of the emissions reduction burden. When a Member state was short on 
allowances, this shortage was almost entirely allocated to the power sector. There was 
an equally consistent attempt to allocate as many allowances as needed to industry. The 
clear distinction between industry and the power sector was justified by a twin rationale: 
the (perceived) abatement potential of sectors and their exposure to non-EU 
competition. Thus, the power sector was allocated the shortage because electricity 
production does not face international, non-EU competition and because power plants 
are believed to have the ability to abate emissions at less cost than others (typically by 
switching to natural gas) and thus have a greater ability to reduce emissions. This choice 
can be observed both in the first and the second allocation phases and it was reinforced 
in the second period by the so-called “windfall profit” concerns. 
- Highly novel new entrant/closure provisions. All Member States have set up reserves 
for new entrants, and most require closed facilities to forfeit post-closure allowances, 
                                                                                                                                               
circumstances. As shown in Figure 2, the Eastern European countries (EU-12) have been allowed to 
increase their emissions compared to theit 2005 emissions, unlike the EU-15 Member States. However, 
the argument is one of degree. 
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even though there are significant differences between the specific Member State 
choices. This choice is neither a feature of other comparable programs nor 
recommended by experts or strongly lobbied for by incumbents. Instead, these measures 
were adopted in order to prevent disadvantaging the EU in competition for new 
investment, and to eliminate an incentive to shut down facilities and move production 
elsewhere.  
Preliminary lessons from the pilot phase 
- The Phase I allocation process was useful. While Phase I allocation was characterized 
by a number of problems, it is important to keep in mind that the first phase of the EU 
ETS was a trial period during which Member States had to submit National Allocation 
Plans within a very short timeframe. Some lessons from the pilot phase are already 
being learned, as is confirmed by several choices in the second phase. In particular, the 
European Commission has harmonized allocation rules across Member States and has 
tightened the carbon constraint in Phase II.  
 - Free allocation does not necessarily lead to “windfall profits”. There can be no doubt 
that freely allocated allowances improve the profitability of covered firms, at least in 
comparison to what would be the case if allowances were auctioned. Determining 
whether a firm is better off compared to an alternative in which there is no CO2 price is 
more difficult. Much depends on whether the regulation to which the firm is subject and 
the competition that it faces allows the CO2 costs to be passed through to consumers. 
Preliminary research indicates that there is some pass-through but that it varies 
considerably and is generally not full pass-through. This is a complicated subject that 
varies by sector and Member State, and research continues. 
- New entrant/closure provisions provided perverse incentives. The main effect of these 
provisions was to preserve pre-policy incentives to invest in polluting technology. They 
also constituted an output subsidy given the emissions constraint. These provisions 
decreased investment costs to a differing degree among Member States, adding 
therefore a potential further distortion to the common market.  
Even though the perverse incentives of these provisions were widely recognized, it was 
not possible to resist political demands. These features represent another distinctive 
difference from similar trading schemes, e.g. in the US, where with few exemptions 
new entrants must purchase the allowances they need and owners of closed facilities 
may keep their allowances. 
From allocation plans to market developments 
Allocation has become an extremely contentious issue in the EU ETS in large part due 
to the accusations of “windfall profits” but also due to “harmonization” concerns about 
the effect of allocations that are different among Member States for like installations. 
These controversies have tended to obscure the most fundamental effect of allocation, 
which is to create a market. The extent to which installations expect to be or find 
themselves short creates demand and those installations that expect to be or find 
themselves long provide the potential supply in addition to whatever auctions may 
occur. If by some miracle of prescience allocations exactly matched allowances, and 
agents knew it, there would be no market. As it was, a widespread market for 
allowances existed in which nearly all Member States participated. For instance, the 
surrender data for one of the coal-fired power plants in the UK that was most short of 
allowances show that it acquired allowances from long installations in 19 of the 24 
other EU Member States. 
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3. Development of the European Allowance Market  
Introduction 
During the first phase of the European Emissions Trading Scheme, the CO2 emissions 
from more than 10,000 installations in the EU-27 were capped at 2.1 billions tons per 
year. Each installation was allocated a share of this total and was able to save, sell or 
buy allowances over the period provided that it could surrender at year’s end a quantity 
of allowances equal to its actual emissions.  
The success of the European carbon market depends on the ability to freely trade 
allowances. This ability was limited in the first period of the EU ETS (2005-2007), as 
installations were unable to bank unused allowances for use during the second period 
(2008-2012) or to borrow allowances from Phase II for use in Phase I. On the other 
hand, free banking and borrowing was allowed within Phase I and will continue to be 
permitted within subsequent periods.  
The quantitative development of the market 
- Volume of transactions. Bilateral forward trades for EU allowances began in the 
spring of 2003, well before the official start of the scheme in January 2005. The spot 
market was launched at the beginning of 2005, with the first national registries entering 
into operation in February. The trading in futures contracts started in mid-2005, when 
the first organized marketplaces were set up.  
The quantity of allowances exchanged in 2005 was relatively low at 262 Mt. Trades 
increased nearly fourfold by 2006, when 809 Mt were exchanged. The maturation of the 
market was confirmed in 2007, when almost 1,500 Mt were traded. This sharp increase 
in transactions included a growing number of Phase II contracts. These contracts for 
future deliveries between 2008 and 2012 represented approximately 4% of total 
exchanges in 2005 but accounted for nearly 85% of market exchanges in 2007. 
- Value of transactions. With an average price of €22 per tonne in 2005, allowance 
transactions totaled €5.97 billion during the year. This total increased to €15.2 billion in 
2006 before reaching €24.1 billion in 2007. According to the World Bank, these totals 
represent about 80% of the value of the world carbon market.8 By comparison, the US 
Acid Rain Program exchanges about $1-2 billion per year. In the past three years, the 
European Union has created by far the largest environmental market in the world. 
Market infrastructure 
- Registries. Under the rules of the Directive, each Member State is obligated to develop 
a national registry in which capped installations must open accounts to register their 
allowance allocations and track all movements of allowances resulting from purchases 
or sales. These registries are essential to assure the environmental integrity of the 
scheme, as capped installations must surrender allowances equal to their actual annual 
emissions. National registries are connected to the Community Independent Transaction 
Log (CITL) which provides allocation and emissions data at the installation level. 
Unfortunately, CITL data are difficult to access and some elements of the data are not 
available to the public. 
- Organized marketplaces. Unlike registries, organized marketplace development was 
the result of voluntary initiatives undertaken primarily by energy market managers. Six 
                                                 
8
 World Bank, May 2007, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2007. 
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marketplaces were launched in 2005, and they have contributed to the transparency and 
liquidity of the market. These marketplaces offer standardized contracts for spot or 
future delivery with public bids and asks, and also provide clearing services that may be 
used in Over-the-Counter (OTC) Transactions. In 2007, organized marketplaces 
facilitated more than 70% of allowance transactions, a steady growth from 
approximately 40% in 2005. Of these transactions, 57% were OTC transactions.  
How the market has facilitated compliance 
The EU ETS is a compliance market, meaning that each installation must surrender each 
year a number of allowances equal to its emissions in the preceding year. The first goal 
of the EU ETS is to facilitate allowance transfers from long players (those with more 
allowances than actual emissions) to short players (those with more actual emissions 
than allowances). Using the CITL database, it is possible to reconstitute the main 
allowance transfers that took place during the first two years of the European market.  
- A transfer of around 409 Mt, valued at €6,540 M, during the first two years. During 
the first two years, there was a net allowance surplus of 2.8%, equal to 118 Mt. Had all 
of the covered installations been long, the carbon market would not have functioned 
during this period. However, while 7250 installations had a gross surplus of 527 Mt, 
2950 installations were short by 409 Mt. If we do not take into account the possibility of 
banking and borrowing between 2005/06 and 2007, the market had to facilitate a 
transfer of 409 Mt between long and short players. Given an average allowance price 
€16 per tonne over the period, these trades had a value of €6,540 M. 
- Geographical transfers. Only five countries were short of allowances from 2005-2006 
periods: the UK (-83 Mt), Italy (-33 Mt), Spain (-25 Mt), Ireland (-6 Mt) and Austria (-1 
Mt). Other countries distributed to their installations more allowances than their actual 
emissions. This led to a significant cross-border flow of allowances. In particular, given 
the overall surplus in Eastern Europe, we estimate that the net flow of allowances 
towards the Western EU-15 countries was 41 Mt, representing a €700 million transfer.  
- Position of sectors and companies. The CITL tracks nine categories of installations, all 
of which had net allowance surpluses, with the noteworthy exception of combustion 
installations which had a net shortage of 14 Mt over 2005-2006. Among these 
installations, power plants had the greatest shortage at 150 Mt and were the main buyers 
on the European market. At the company-level, the top three shortest firms were all 
from the power production sector: Enel (-10 Mt/yr), RWE (-10 Mt/yr) and Endesa (-8 
Mt/yr). 
Carbon pricing 
The EUA price is governed by the balance between supply and demand. As no Kyoto 
credits could be traded during the first period and installations could not borrow 
allowances from the second period, the number of allowances available on the market 
equaled the number of allowances initially allocated to installations. Thus, total supply 
was determined by the political decisions regarding Member State caps, as discussed 
previously in the chapter on allocation.  
Due to the inability to bank allowances between the first and second periods, allowance 
demand was driven by anticipated emissions during the first three years of the scheme, 
which depended on economic growth, weather conditions, relative energy prices and 
marginal abatement costs. These different drivers can explain carbon pricing during the 
first market period, which was marked by three main stages: 
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- The launch period (Jan. 2005-Apr. 2006). During this stage, the power sector 
immediately started buying the allowances it needed, whereas many players with 
surplus allowances were not prepared to sell their EUAs. Demand from power 
producers rose over the period due to increased gas prices during the winter. This 
created scarcity and increased carbon prices. The information available on the market 
was very poor, and most of the participants expected a global short market.  
- The information shock (Apr.-May 2006). In April, the European Commission released 
the 2005 emissions data for the installations covered by the EU ETS, which showed a 
4% allowance surplus. The news hit EUA prices hard as the supposed scarcity of the 
asset confronted the reality of a surplus. The market experienced a high level of price 
volatility, which disrupted the stable and long-term price signal required for participants 
to engage in GHG emissions reductions. 
- Total disconnection between the first and the second period prices (since Nov. 2006). 
EUA Phase I prices started to converge towards zero, reflecting the allowance surplus 
over 2005-2007. Phase I allowance prices fell under 1 €/tCO2 in February 2007 and 
ended 2007 at 0.02 €t/CO2. Phase I contracts were unlikely to react to traditional price 
drivers, and volatility remained very high. Phase I transactions became scarce and the 
real market activity shifted toward second period allowances.  
EUA prices for 2008-2012 remained relatively steady and rose to as much as €25 in 
response to the European Commission’s stricter review of second period NAPs and the 
European Council’s decision to reduce EU emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020 
(as compared to 8% below 1990 levels in 2008-12). The price volatility for Phase II 
remained at reasonable levels, providing market participants with more adequate price 
signals for the medium term.  
Because installations may bank allowances between the second and third periods, the 
anticipated balance between the supply and demand of carbon emission rights between 
2008 and 2012 will be significantly impacted by post-2012 expectations. In particular, if 
the European Commission’s proposal for the post-2012 ETS is adopted in its current 
form, it will have very different market consequences depending upon whether or not an 
international climate agreement is achieved. As a result, industries are now operating 
with a long-term price signal that depends on very uncertain future international 
political events. 
Some preliminary conclusions 
Over 2005-2007, the European market developed strongly in terms of traded volumes 
and market infrastructure. An effective carbon price has emerged on this market, 
reflecting balance between supply and demand. The observed balance for the first 
period led to a price close to zero in 2007 that is economically rational given the 
allowance surplus. On the other hand, steady prices for the second period reflected the 
anticipated scarcity resulting from political decisions and commitments. 
The experience of the first three years provides us with two important lessons that may 
be applied to any new environmental trading scheme: 
- Market efficiency depends on market participants’ ability to access reliable 
information. The first stages of the EU ETS have suffered from a lack of information at 
the installation level and from the practical difficulty of accessing reliable information 
from the CITL data bank. This contributed to price instability. While provisions for the 
second period will improve information availability, not all information will be publicly 
available.  
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- The decision to not allow inter-period banking strongly contributed to price volatility 
and led to a complete disconnection between the first two periods of the market. Indeed, 
in the absence of banking, industrial players cannot hedge between the current carbon 
constraint they are facing and the constraints they are anticipating in the future. The 
inability to bank into the second period reduced the decision horizon significantly, led 
to inequity among industrial players plagued with unused and worthless allowances at 
the end of period, and limited the incentives to reduce emissions through early reduction 
decisions.  
During its first period, the EU ETS was able to overcome these flaws thanks to the 
leadership of the European Commission and the strong political commitment of the 
European Council to continue to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, the 
collapse of the first period carbon price has not jeopardized the expansion of the trading 
scheme. This is probably one of the most impressive results of this first trial period: all 
the big industrial and financial players now accept that carbon is no longer free in 
Europe and that the carbon emissions will continue to be costly in the future. This is a 
major achievement after only three years.  
 
4. Did Emissions Abatement Occur? 
Introduction 
The aim of carbon markets is to provide incentives to reduce CO2 emissions. These 
incentives can influence both the short-term and long-term decisions of market players. 
Short-term incentives induce plant managers to reduce emissions today using available 
technology and capital stock. Long-term incentives impact managers’ investment 
decisions over the long term. Because long-term incentives lead managers to account 
for carbon prices as they plan new capital investments, these incentives can have lasting 
impacts on the economy. 
The US Acid Rain Program, which established a market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
allowances, provided long-term incentives from its outset. The program allowed 
companies to bank allowances freely for use in future years, thus enabling them to 
incorporate SO2 prices into their long-term investment decisions. As a result, 
installations were able to invest immediately in costly equipment to reduce their 
emissions, and SO2 emission reductions were achieved within a short timeframe. 
In the EU ETS, companies were unable to bank unused allowances from the first period 
to the second, and thus had no long-term incentive to modify their investment plans. 
However, the EU ETS did provide some short-term incentives which led to limited 
abatement in the first two periods.  
Limited but significant abatement during the first two years 
Research continues on this topic. However, preliminary results indicate that a modest 
amount of abatement occurred in 2005-06, fully in line with the modest ambition of the 
cap imposed in the first trading period. When viewed from the most aggregate level, 
three observations make plausible a conclusion that some abatement occurred: 
- A significant price was paid for CO2 emissions during 2005-06, and this would have 
had the effect of reducing emissions as firms adjusted to the new economic reality. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that firms did take the CO2 price into account, especially 
in the power sector.  
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- Real output in the EU increased in 2005-06 at a relatively robust rate, which when 
compared with historical rates of improvement in energy and CO2 intensity, suggests 
that emissions would have increased or at the very least remained consistent with earlier 
years. 
- Verified emissions in 2005-06 were lower than EU emissions in 2002-04, even after 
allowing for plausible upward bias in the pre-2005 data. 
In a preliminary but detailed analysis of this data, Ellerman and Buchner (forthcoming 
in Environmental and Resource Economics) concluded that a reasonable estimate of the 
reduction in CO2 emissions attributable to the EU ETS lies between 50 and 100 million 
tons for each year, or between 2.5% and 5% from what emissions would have been 
without the EU ETS. In making this finding, Ellerman and Buchner also note that such a 
finding does not rule out over-allocation, which clearly existed in some Member States 
and sectors. When combined with the absence of banking, the over-allocation created 
the effectively zero EUA price in 2007, when it is likely that little abatement occurred.  
Emissions reductions often appear where they are not expected  
The preliminary results from more focused research on the German and UK electricity 
sectors support this finding of modest abatement. In Germany, a shift from higher 
emitting lignite (brown coal) generation to lower emitting hard coal generation can be 
observed, as well as an increase in the use of biomass. In the UK, coal generation 
actually increased and natural gas generation decreased despite the new carbon price 
because of a reduction in nuclear generation and exceedingly high natural gas prices in 
2005 and early 2006. Still, it is likely that coal generation would have been even greater 
without the CO2 price and research is underway to attempt to determine the extent. 
Also, in the UK there was a noticeable improvement in the CO2 efficiency of coal-fired 
generating plants, which could have been due to increased use of biomass or improved 
energy efficiency in response to the sharp increase in the cost of using coal to generate 
electricity.  
An important observation arising out of these focused studies is that the EU ETS is 
creating abatement opportunities that had not previously been expected. To date, most 
attention has focused on switching from coal to natural gas, which did not occur in the 
magnitudes expected, largely because of the higher than expected natural gas price. In 
contrast, little to no attention had been given to either the intra-fuel substitution 
observed in Germany or the improved CO2 efficiency observed in the UK. This result is 
consistent with results observed in the US cap-and-trade systems for SO2 and NOx 
emissions, where unexpected methods of emission reduction accounted for a significant 
share of the emission reductions. 
 
5. Links Between the Carbon Market and the Power Industry 
Introduction 
The launch of Phase I of the EU ETS in January 2005 coincided with a particularly 
turbulent period in Europe’s electricity markets. Two European Commission Directives, 
Directive 2003/54/EC (Internal electricity market) and Directive 2005/89/EC (Security 
of electricity supply) advanced the objective of complete liberalization of electricity and 
gas markets in the European Union. In parallel, Europe experienced an intense process 
of industrial concentration with a de facto transnational oligopoly emerging around 
EDF, E.ON, ENEL, RWE and Suez – Gaz de France.  
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Coupled with the intrinsic short-term inelasticity of electricity demand due to the 
absence of storage, the establishment of wholesale markets outside national regulatory 
oversight and the movement towards concentration have repeatedly given rise to 
suspicions of the abuse of market power. There are also concerns about lack of 
investment in the face of rising demand, which can be a profitable strategy in the 
absence of vigorous competition. It should not be forgotten that electricity production 
continues to be subjected to increasing returns to scale and incurs substantial 
indivisibilities (technical competence, in particular when operating nuclear power 
plants, financial savvy, as well as the ability to spread risks over different geographic 
markets). The volatility and risk of electricity markets in the wake of liberalization has 
probably increased rather than decreased the optimal size of an operator.    
To top it off, western and central Europe experienced severe cold snaps, both in winter 
2004-2005 and 2005-2006, which in conjunction with low hydropower levels led to 
dramatically high electricity price spikes during the period the EU ETS was introduced. 
On 28 November 2005, for instance, the price for an MWh of peak load power on the 
day-ahead spot market reached a staggering price of 255 Euros. 
Interactions between carbon price and electricity price 
There is certainly a close connection between electricity and carbon prices. However, 
one should not forget that electricity prices had plenty of reasons quite independent 
from the newly introduced EU ETS to be both unusually high and volatile during Phase 
I, in particular during the crucial period stretching from the beginning of 2005 until 
spring 2006. European electricity markets remain in a phase of transition. Contrary to 
the ultimate objective of the European Commission, the European electricity market is 
not yet a “copper plate” where a point-source of demand can be serviced with minimal 
transaction costs by any provider in the system. It is instead a complex web of national 
markets in which limited and varying interconnection capacity opens and closes markets 
in a matter of hours or less.  
We can observe two important facts in this context. First, gas-fired power generation is 
increasingly the choice of investors in volatile markets due to its short lead times and its 
flexibility. With gas thus being the marginal fuel for peak production, the interaction 
between gas, carbon and electricity prices is particularly close. Second, the growth of 
electricity demand in Europe has slowed remarkably in the last three years and declined 
in some sectors, which is at least partly due to the electricity price rises in which carbon 
prices play an important role. 
Looking at the interaction between carbon and electricity prices, one must distinguish 
their interaction in the long-term and the short-term. In the long-term futures market, the 
price of the one-year electricity contract (calendar) displays a very solid relationship 
with the carbon allowance price. Given that most electricity is traded on these one-year 
forward contracts, one can conclude that producers and consumers now fully integrate 
the price of carbon into their long-term calculations.  
But what determines the price of a carbon allowance? This question is much more 
difficult to answer and depends largely on complex interrelations in the spot market. 
That interaction is complicated by the fact that electricity prices are very volatile due to 
the non-storability of electricity. Supply and demand (the latter varying in an 
unpredictable manner in function of the weather, TV programming, etc.) thus need to be 
calculated at virtually every second. The price of carbon allowances – assets that may 
be used without loss at any time during the Phase I allocation period 2005-2007 – 
should be much more stable.  
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What is surprising then is that carbon, gas and electricity prices over certain periods 
correlate quite well in the short-term. Partly this is due to the fact that the EU ETS is a 
fairly young market in which traders are still looking for identifiable patterns 
independent of the real conditions of power generation, information which is difficult to 
forward to the trading desks. In addition, there is some evidence that high electricity 
spot prices due, for instance, to market power, are seen as a signal to raise carbon prices.  
Carbon price and profitability of power producers 
European power companies enjoyed large profits during Phase I of the EU ETS. Many 
factors contributed to this trend. Power producers took advantage of the rise in energy 
prices as electricity markets were liberalized. Furthermore, high natural gas and oil 
prices increased the profitability of nuclear power and hydropower. In this context, free 
allocation of carbon allowances provided additional profit opportunities in 2005 and 
2006: the so-called “windfall profits”. 
Receiving large amounts of allowances strengthens a company’s balance sheet even if it 
needs to use the allowances during the rest of the year for its operations. More 
important is the fact that higher revenues due to higher electricity prices are not offset 
by higher costs as long as the allowances are received for free. In addition, operators 
profited from the fact that the market vastly overestimated the scarcity and the price of 
carbon allowances. While de facto more allowances than needed were allocated and 
prices should have been low from the start, prices held up well during 2005 and 2006, 
providing handy profit opportunities.  
All of these factors provided additional profits to European power operators, whose 
share prices have all surged during the past three years (in some cases, however, the 
beginning of the surge preceded the introduction of the EU ETS). This is the primary 
reason that the European Commission wants to introduce full auctioning of allowances 
in the electricity sector by 2013. While so far power producers have profited 
indiscriminately from the EU ETS, full auctioning would drive a wedge between 
carbon-intensive producers and carbon-free producers. While the former would lose 
their windfall profits from higher prices, the latter would continue to profit from them, 
thus making investments in nuclear power or renewable energies more attractive. 
 
6. Carbon Price and Industrial Competitiveness 
Introduction 
To date, the EU is the only region of the world to have implemented a multi-sector 
greenhouse gas trading scheme to reduce the emissions that cause climate change. The 
EU ETS sets a price on carbon and forces emitters to internalize the negative impacts of 
their greenhouse gas emissions.  
Industries outside the EU do not face these same carbon prices, and as a result may use 
this cost advantage to gain market share. As European companies face market share 
losses, they may choose to relocate overseas, where they will not be required to pay for 
their carbon emissions. This “leakage” would both undermine the environmental 
integrity of the European trading scheme and reduce economic activity in Europe. This 
is why an analysis of how the EU ETS affects European competitiveness is essential. 
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Competitiveness and the EU ETS: definitions and scope 
Paul Krugman, in his famous article “Competitiveness: a dangerous obsession,”9 warned 
against the view that nations, like companies, compete against each other, and that their 
economic problems are attributable to a failure to compete on global markets. 
Krugman’s advice is all the more relevant for an analysis of the EU ETS, whose effects 
are felt almost exclusively by a subset of economic activities within Europe: energy-
intensive and trade-exposed industrial activities.  
Among these industries, power generation is to a large extent not directly exposed to 
international competition. Therefore, the sectors we include in our analysis include 
cement, refining, iron and steel, paper and pulp, petrochemicals, glass, and aluminium.10 
In 2005, these sectors accounted for less than five percent of EU Gross Domestic 
Product and their share in labour employment was even smaller. Thus, it would be 
inappropriate to draw broad macroeconomic conclusions from our study of these 
industries. 
In our analysis we employ the OECD’s pragmatic definition of competitiveness: at the 
microeconomic or sector-specific level, competitiveness is the ability to produce high-
quality, differentiated products at the lowest cost possible to sustain market shares and 
profitability. These two latest criteria can be applied to detect short-term or long-term 
changes in competitiveness. In the short run, diminished industrial competitiveness will 
erode the profitability of existing facilities, reduce the operating rate of the less 
competitive plants, and increase net imports. In the long run, managers will likely react 
to market changes by modifying their investment plans. Decisions to invest in new 
capacity take years to finalise in heavy industry. Any impact on locating new capacity 
outside the EU at the expense of existing EU capacity would thus take some time to 
materialise. This is why our study currently addresses only the issue of short-term 
competitiveness. 
Results to date by industry 
- Cement industry. Our analysis of the cement industry focuses on the impact of the EU 
ETS on net exports in the cement market. An empirical statistical analysis for four 
European countries (France, Portugal, Spain, and the UK) for the period (at best) 1976-
2005 shows that production capacity rate is the main driver of net exports and that 
relative energy cost plays a very secondary role. In addition, it turns out that carbon 
price does not have a significant impact on net cement exports over this period. 
Lessons from these empirical results are limited. We will continue our research in two 
directions: the long-run impact of production cost on investment decisions and the 
determinants of cement prices. Both elements will prove critical to estimating the effect 
of the EU ETS on competitiveness in the cement industry. 
- Refining. The refining sector encompasses a large spectrum of petrochemical plants 
that treat crude oil to produce petroleum products. It appears that the competitiveness 
effects of the EU ETS on these plants have been very modest. No significant changes in 
petroleum product trade flows, production patterns or prices were found. We note, 
however, that allowance prices were dwarfed by high refining margins over the period. 
Moreover, while the sector curtailed its emissions by 0.56% from 2005 to 2006, it 
enjoyed a 7% surplus in allowances and thus did not face direct allowance procurement 
costs. 
                                                 
9
 Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994, vol. 73, number 2. 
10
 While the aluminium sector is not covered in the first two phases of the EU ETS, it is very electricity-
intensive and thus vulnerable to the pass-through of CO2 prices into electricity prices. 
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Interviews with refining executives revealed that the EU ETS, together with rising 
energy prices, were instrumental in increasing industry’s awareness of low-hanging 
emissions abatement opportunities, and in inducing firms to build new capabilities to 
respond to the subsequent phases of the scheme. Refineries will face tightening carbon 
constraints due to a structural trend toward heavier crude, which implies additional 
process emissions. Under such constraints, and as one of the sectors most exposed to 
foreign trade, the refining sector could suffer from a significant competitiveness burden. 
- Steel. Steel is another sector with high carbon intensity per tonne of primary output. 
While the scrap-based electric arc furnace process is much less energy-intensive than 
the blast furnace, its expansion is limited by the availability of scrap. The sector was 
also exposed to a rise in electricity prices. The use of blast furnace gases for power 
generation also created problems in the allocation process. 
Data from the Community International Transaction Log (CITL) indicates that the iron 
and steel sector has generally benefited from an allocation above its reported emissions, 
even if at rare occasions installations in this sector have relied on foreign allowances to 
achieve compliance. In addition, high steel prices throughout the period make it difficult 
to observe any effect of carbon prices on the sector’s profitability. No conclusion can be 
made at this stage, and further analysis must completed on this sector using the 
methodology developed for the cement sector and pending data availability. 
- Aluminium. With its very high electricity use per unit of output, primary aluminium 
stands out among the sectors we analyzed. While aluminium sector emissions are not 
currently capped by the EU ETS, we anticipated that the sector would likely experience 
profit and market share losses as electricity prices increased due to the CO2 price pass-
through. However, international aluminium prices skyrocketed from 2003 onward, an 
occurrence which could partially blur any effect of higher power prices on European 
smelters’ operational margins. 
Europe has been a net importer of primary aluminium for some years, with its smelters 
operating at full capacity. Has the price of CO2 triggered additional imports into the EU, 
which could be interpreted as a loss of market share due to climate policy? Statistical 
analysis of 1999-2006 data invalidates this hypothesis. However, smelters were not 
generally exposed to a cost of CO2 in electricity prices: only 18% of capacity operated 
without long-term power contracts in 2006, essentially in Germany and the Netherlands. 
By 2010, power supply contracts will expire for 65% of European capacity. The 
reaction of smelters in this new price environment will be an indication of the 
seriousness of leakage in this sector. 
Preliminary conclusions 
To this point, we have not found empirical evidence demonstrating a correlation 
between European carbon prices and a loss of competitiveness in the industrial sectors 
included in our analysis. However, these results were obtained in an environment in 
which allocations were overly generous for the covered industries. In addition, the years 
2005-2007 have been marked by remarkably high commodity prices and profits in these 
sectors. Any impact of the CO2 constraint on industry is likely to be felt more strongly 
when markets are less favourable. 
Additional investigations must be conducted to confirm these preliminary results on 
short-term competitiveness and to asses the question of the long-term impacts on 
investment decisions. And the impact of the EU ETS on the competitiveness of heavy 
industry is only one part of the question. Another important dimension is how the 
scheme may spur investments in the low-carbon technologies that are likely to be in 
high demand as other regions launch GHG mitigation efforts. These new sectors, whose 
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development may be stimulated by European carbon prices, should be included in future 
analyses.  
 
7. Expanding the European Carbon Market 
Introduction 
Upon its launch in 2005, the EU ETS covered the CO2 emissions of energy-intensive 
sectors in 25 Member States. These emissions represented 41% of all European GHG 
emissions, as non-CO2 emissions from sectors such as agriculture, housing and 
transportation were not included. More generally, the gases covered by the EU ETS 
represented only 11% of GHG emissions from developed nations and less than 5% of 
the world total. 
From the start, the scope of the EU ETS was designed to be enlarged. The ETS 
Directive included provisions to extend the cap by opting-in additional installations, by 
linking the EU ETS with other cap-and-trade schemes, and by linking the scheme to the 
international Kyoto credit market. The EU’s use of these provisions resulted in the first 
empirical experience with linking different carbon markets. This experience provides 
valuable lessons on how linking may be incorporated into future climate regimes. 
Geographical and sectoral extension of the cap 
Since 2005, the coverage of the EU ETS has grown by approximately 6% due to three 
factors: Member States could unilaterally opt-in some installations; Romania and 
Bulgaria joined the scheme in 2007; and in 2008, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein 
also joined the ETS, with Norway connecting its existing cap-and-trade program to the 
European scheme. 
- The limits of the “opt-in provision”. During the first phase, Member States were 
allowed to opt-in installations below capacity limits in ETS sectors, but only five 
Member States took advantage of the opportunity to opt-in combustion installations of 
20 MW or less. From 2008 on, Members States may opt-in other activities, installations 
and/or GHGs. Out of the ten largest countries, only France and the Netherlands have 
taken advantage of this. They have included some combustion facilities below 20 MW 
as well as some N2O-emitting facilities from the chemical industry, a move which 
extended the cap a further 5.2 Mt and 1.4 MtCO2eq per year, respectively. 
Obstacles to using the opt-in provision seem to be three-fold: small installations that are 
opted-in may incur high transaction costs for monitoring, reporting and verifying their 
emissions; Member States do not have any incentive to opt-in large installations if their 
cap is too tight; and non-CO2 emissions are not always easy to monitor. In some cases, 
as with landfill gas projects, it is easier to monitor captured emissions than continuous 
emissions. 
- The integration of Bulgaria and Romania. Romania and Bulgaria were obligated to 
join the EU ETS when they became Member States in 2007. Both countries proposed 
much higher caps than were found acceptable by the European Commission, and they 
are appealing the Commission’s decisions to the European Court of First Instance. 
Romania and Bulgaria will most likely be given more leeway to increase their CO2 
emissions during Phase III (2013-2020).  
The lesson here is that countries can be integrated into the EU ETS (“stick”) if the 
integration is part of a larger political deal (“carrot”), which in this case was becoming 
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part of the European Union. Despite the size of the carrot, full integration in the scheme 
appears to have generated political tension. 
- The link with the Norwegian scheme. On 1 January 2008, the European Economic 
Area (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) joined the EU ETS. In 2005, Norway had set 
up its own ETS with an absolute cap on emissions. The Norwegian ETS initially 
covered 51 large CO2-emitting installations accounting for 10 to 15% of national GHG 
emissions. In 2008, Norway adapted its ETS to link with the EU ETS by including 
offshore oil and gas facilities as well as pulp and paper plants. The EU ETS now covers 
100 installations in Norway and 35 to 40% of the nation’s emissions. This rapid 
integration was facilitated by strong political will and by the fact that the rules of 
Norway’s existing ETS – regarding sectoral coverage, allocation, monitoring and 
verification – were compatible with the European scheme. 
Linking with project-based mechanisms 
Installations included in the EU ETS may use a certain number of Kyoto project-based 
credits for their compliance. During Phase II (2008-2012), operators are allowed to 
import up to 1,392 million credits. This partial fungibility has helped to launch the 
market for project-based credits.  
- The EU ETS has driven the development of the international Kyoto credit market. On 
the international market, the two main potential buyers of Kyoto credits until 2012 are 
the Annex I countries and the EU ETS installations of Europe. At the outset of the 
international market, government demand appeared to drive the demand for Kyoto 
credits. Governments were the main participants in public and mixed-capital funds, 
which started to operate as early as 1999. Private sector investments took off starting in 
2004/2005 when the EU ETS was established. European industry strongly contributed 
to Kyoto project financing by providing the first capital to private carbon investment 
funds.  
The demand stemming from the EU ETS has led the price of European allowances 
(EUAs) to become the reference price for most contracts on CERs, the credits generated 
by Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, and ERUs, the credits generated by 
Joint Implementation (JI) projects. As a consequence, the price of CERs is fairly well 
correlated with the price of EUAs, with a discount for risk. Thus, the European carbon 
price was a major trigger for the development of international projects. Private 
investment in carbon procurement vehicles that funded CDM and JI projects soared 
over the last three years and now represents more than half of the €7 billion raised. 
Project developers have responded to this demand by developing Kyoto projects around 
the world. Today, more than 3,000 CDM projects, amounting to 2.5 GtCO2 of emission 
reductions until 2012, are in the pipeline, and projects registered by the United Nations 
account for 1.2 GtCO2 until 2012. The development of JI projects started later but has 
gained momentum more recently in Russia and Eastern Europe. Russia and Ukraine will 
supply the bulk of JI credits until 2012. 
Thanks to the carbon price established by the EU ETS, Europe has generated significant 
emissions reductions in developing and Eastern European countries. It is worth noting 
that the European Commission intends to use the future potential financial flows 
generated by these emission reductions to negotiate future commitments by developing 
countries in post-2012 agreements. 
- The use of JI mechanisms may further extend the sectoral coverage of the EU ETS. 
Joint Implementation projects can provide an incentive to reduce EU-based GHG 
emissions that are not covered by the EU ETS. Most of the new Member States have 
established procedures to host JI projects on their territory, and in the EU-15, France, 
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Germany, Spain and Denmark have done the same. In France, the legal framework was 
established and the first methodologies were approved in 2007. Over 30 projects are 
being developed in the sectors of energy, transportation and agriculture, and these 
projects should reduce emissions by 3 to 5 MtCO2 over 2008-2012.  
In Germany, over 70 projects are being developed. One of the three projects that have 
been approved by the government so far is a programmatic JI project that deals with 
energy efficiency. 
The post-2012 EU ETS draft directive includes a provision that would enable the 
adoption of harmonized rules for European projects. These projects would allow the 
price signal of the EU ETS to finance emissions reductions in sectors like housing, 
agriculture and transportation, which are difficult to integrate into a cap-and-trade 
scheme. The success of the projects depends on several conditions: the rules should be 
easy for project developers to understand; they should favor top-down methodologies 
with standardized baselines and standardized ways of proving additionality; and they 
should provide for a predictable process that encourages project development. 
Preliminary lessons 
During the first three years of the EU ETS, the European Union has set up a political 
and technological framework that limits the previously free right to emit CO2. It has 
also demonstrated that it is possible to expand an existing trading scheme to other areas 
to take advantage of additional emissions reduction opportunities. This experience has 
already led to a significant expansion of the scope of activity impacted by carbon prices 
and provides several lessons for future programs. 
- Opt-in provisions play a limited role in enlarging the scope of carbon markets created 
by decentralized cap-and-trade schemes. This is why the European Commission has 
elected to expressly include air transportation in the post-2012 EU ETS, and why it is 
also considering including maritime transport. Opt-in agreements have much in 
common with the voluntary sectoral agreements being considered for inclusion in future 
international climate architecture. The lesson drawn from the European experience is 
that one should not overestimate the value of such voluntary agreements. 
- The integration of new countries in the EU ETS has been rapid and complete. This 
integration was possible due to the very specific context in which new participants had 
large political interests to participate at the scheme. This same ease of integration seems 
very unlikely with other existing or scheduled schemes like those of Australia, New 
Zealand, RGGI and possibly the US. An indirect link through the use of common 
project-based mechanisms whose credits can be imported and traded between the 
different capped entities may be a useful intermediate step in linking these schemes. 
- The European carbon market has played a key role in the development of 
international credit-based mechanisms. The next generation of CDM projects should 
correct the flaws which appeared during the launching period. The potential GHG 
emissions reductions could be multiplied with programmatic approaches that could 
present a real opportunity for better integration of developing countries in a future 
international climate agreement. In this context, the European Commission’s post-2012 
draft proposal seems a sort of “double or nothing” proposition: if this proposal is 
adopted and there is a new international climate agreement, the Kyoto project credit 
market will continue to be stimulated by the EU ETS; on the other hand, if there is no 
new international climate agreement, the Kyoto project credit market could be severely 
weakened, as European industry will retreat from the market for Kyoto credits. 
- The European Commission’s post-2012 draft proposal could lead to standardized and 
harmonized European projects which could be credited with European allowances. If 
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properly developed, a European domestic offset scheme could deliver substantial 
emissions reductions in non-capped sectors and reinforce the strong complementarity 
between cap-and-trade systems and project-based mechanisms. 
 
8. Conclusions  
- The pilot phase was useful. The first phase of the EU ETS was characterized by a 
number of problems, but it is important to keep in mind that its aim was to make the 
system run, and that this was done within a very short timeframe. Lessons from the pilot 
phase are already being learned, as is confirmed by several allocation choices in the 
second phase. For example, countries followed more harmonized allocation rules in 
Phase II, and National Allocation Plans provide fewer allowances. An important insight 
from the pilot phase is that not all elements have to be in place when an emissions 
trading scheme is launched. 
- Carbon now has a real price. From 2005-2007, the European market developed 
strongly in terms of traded volumes and market infrastructure. An effective carbon price 
has emerged on this market that reflects the balance between supply and demand. The 
observed balance for the first period led to a price close to zero in 2007 that was 
economically rational given the allowance surplus. On the other hand, steady prices for 
the second period reflect the scarcity anticipated by market players due to political 
decisions and commitments. All the big industrial and financial players now consider 
carbon to be no longer free in Europe and that carbon emissions will continue to be 
costly in the future. This is a major achievement after only three years.  
- Carbon price has induced some emissions abatement. Despite over-allocation, which 
clearly existed in some Member States and sectors, a significant price was paid for CO2 
emissions during 2005-06 which induced some emissions abatement. While switching 
from coal to natural gas did not occur in the magnitudes expected, other unanticipated 
emission reduction strategies were employed, including intra-fuel substitution (brown to 
hard coal) in Germany and improved CO2 efficiency in the UK.  
- Carbon price has had a limited impact on industrial competitiveness. In the power 
industry, only a part of the profits made in 2005 and 2006 can be attributed to carbon 
prices being passed through to consumers. The industry enjoyed “windfall profits” due 
in part to free allowance allocation, but also due to market restructuring and high fossil 
fuel prices during the period. In the non-power sectors, including cement, refining, steel 
and aluminum, international competition makes it difficult, if not impossible, to pass 
carbon prices on to consumers. To date, there is no empirical evidence of any market 
share loss in these sectors due to carbon pricing. However, from our first investigations 
we are unable to make any conclusions regarding the long-term competitiveness of 
these industries, especially when future stronger carbon constraints may affect them.  
- The European carbon market has had external impacts. From its inception, the EU 
ETS was designed to be enlarged. Since 2005, the scope of the EU ETS has been 
significantly extended. Two new Member States, Romania and Bulgaria, have been 
included, and the European scheme has been linked to the Norwegian emissions trading 
program. The EU ETS’s link with the international Kyoto credit market has driven the 
development of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in developing 
countries and has led to additional emissions reductions through Joint Implementation 
(JI) projects. The development of the European carbon market has provided the first 
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empirical experience with linking different carbon markets. It provides valuable lessons 
on how linking may be incorporated into future climate regimes. 
- Lessons from the EU ETS can be applied to future climate negotiations. The EU ETS 
is a true multi-national system. The European Union is home to 500 million people, 
living in 27 countries, embracing 23 languages, with per capita GDP ranging from 
$42,000 (Ireland) to $9,000 (Romania and Bulgaria). Through the EU ETS, nations of 
widely varying circumstances and commitments to climate policy have agreed to a 
common constraint. Europe’s choice of emissions trading has created a ‘fact on the 
ground’ that will be difficult to ignore in future global climate negotiations. The EU 
ETS is likely to contribute to the shape of a future global system, and is already 
instructive for emerging national and regional schemes.  
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1. Historical Background of the EU ETS 
Figure 1 - European climate change policy: from carbon taxes to emissions 
trading. 
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Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts, 2008. 
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2. The First Step: Allowance Allocation  
Figure 2 – The EU 15 and the new Member States face different allocation 
constraints. 
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Note: NAPs allocations exclude reserves and added installations. 
Source: European Commission, 2008. 
Figure 3 - The combustion sector faces the only net allowance shortage over 
2005 and 2006. 
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Source: CITL, 2007. 
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3. Development of the European Allowance Market 
Figure 4 - An effective but volatile carbon price signal. 
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1. High volatility: price shock in April-May 2006 (compliance data release). 
2. First period allowance price converges towards zero: surplus of allowances and no 
banking between periods. 
3. Higher prices for second period allowances due to expected scarcity with stricter NAPII 
decisions and European Council commitments. 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts, 2007. 
Figure 5 - Net positions of all installations for 2005 and 2006 
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Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts; CITL, 2007. 
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Figure 6 - A few countries were short on allowances. 
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Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts ; CITL, 2007. 
Figure 7 - Transfers between the EU 15 and new Member States in 2005 and 
2006: physical and financial flows. 
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Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts; CITL, 2007. 
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4. Did Emissions Abatement Occur? 
Figure 8 - A scenario for emissions in absence of the EU ETS. 
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Source: Ellerman and Buchner, 2008. 
Comparing Business-as-Usual estimates (+1.0% or +2.0% growth) with actual verified 
emissions allows us to calculate the potential abatement that took place in 2005 and 2006. 
Figure 9 - Comparing 2005 emissions with a BAU scenario shows that some 
abatement took place. 
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5. Links between the Carbon Market and the Power Industry 
Figure 10 - Fuel prices were major drivers of electricity price fluctuations. 
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Source: Ellerman and Joskow, 2008. 
Figure 11 - Recurring net income for a selection of large emitting power 
producers, 2004-2007. 
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Note: recalculations from net income to recurrent income (i.e. excluding non-recurring 
activities) might not be consistent among those firms and should only be considered 
indicative. 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts, using annual report data, 2008. 
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6. Carbon Price and Industrial Competitiveness 
Table 1 - Carbon price has varying impacts across industries. 
Sector Sub-sector 
Share 
in EU25 
total 
value 
added 
(2001-
2003) 
* 
Share 
in EU 
ETS 
** 
CO2 share 
in 
product 
price 
(direct 
and 
indirect) 
*** 
EU25 
External 
Trade 
Perfor-
mance 
* 
Average 
annual 
growth 
(2000-
2005) 
**** 
Direct 
jobs 
**** 
Electricity production 52% 2 - 9% 5,1% Combustion 
Other combustion 
2% 
18% - 
- 
5,4% 
13 000 
Refineries   0,30% 8% 0 - 1% -0,08 2,5% 1 655 
Basic Oxygen 
Furnace 1 - 4 % Iron and steel 
Electric Arc Furnace 
0,70% 8% 
5 - 10 % 
-0,18 -0,5% 11 100 
Cement   9% 2 - 6% 2,8% 821 
Glass   1% - -0,5% 3 848 
Ceramics   
0,85% 
1% - 
0,27 
-7,3% 2 000 
Pulp & Paper   0,55% 2% 1 - 5 % 0,18 2,3% 7 340 
Aluminum   - 0% 8 - 15 % - -1,2% 1 258 
Note: Sector definitions may vary with indicators and sources. External trade 
performance compares the trade balance (exports minus imports) for a product in one 
economic area (here, the EU25) to the total trade in that product worldwide.  
Sources:  *European Commission, DG Enterprise & Industry - **CITL (2007) -  
***P. Lund, Stanford Energy Workshop 2007, Helsinki University of Technology; figures 
rounded up, assuming a carbon price between €25 and €40/t - ****Eurostat. 
Figure 12 - Cement and clinker imports into the EU-15 from outside the EU, 
1995-2006. 
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Source: Neil Walker, from “CO2 Price Effects on EU Industry”, presentation delivered at 
Research Program workshop on 24 January, 2008. 
Clinker is the main material used in cement manufacture. Chemical reactions during clinker 
production are responsible for half of the CO2 emissions produced during cement processing. 
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7. Expanding the European Carbon Market 
Figure 13 - Emissions reductions resulting from Kyoto credit projects. 
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Figure 14 - EU ETS demand is driving the rise in Kyoto project credit prices. 
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Source: ECX, Reuters 
The correlation between the two series shows that the price of Certified Emissions Reductions 
(CERs) generated under the Clean Development Mechanism is driven by European allowances 
(EUA) price. 
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